Mere protest, social media posts no ground to act under section 186 of IPC: Himachal Pradesh HC

Shimla: The Himachal Pradesh High Court recently passed a verdict saying that a mere act of protest or making remarks on social media without any accompanying threat or force does not constitute obstruction of a public servant in the discharge of his public functions under section 186 of Indian Penal Code.

The court cited previous judgments, including Surinder Singh Chauhan versus State of Himachal Pradesh, to support its decision.

The court inferred that passive conduct or verbal protests, in the absence of any physical interference or threat, do not amount to voluntary obstruction of a public servant.

This interpretation aims to ensure that the right to protest is not unduly curtailed while maintaining the efficacy of public servants in discharging their duties.

The judgment quashed the charges under Section 186 of IPC against Sita Ram Sharma and acquitted him of all allegations.

The court emphasized that continuing with the trial would constitute an abuse of the legal process, given the lack of substantial evidence to support the charge of obstruction.

Delivering a verdict recently in a case of Sita Ram Sharma vs State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr, the bench of Justice Sandeep Sharma, held that the essential ingredients for an offence under Section 186 IPC were not met.

The court observed that there was no physical obstruction or overt act by the petitioner that hindered the police officer.

The judgment clarifies the scope of Section 186 IPC, emphasising that mere verbal protests without physical obstruction do not constitute an offence under this section.

The case involves the petitioner, Sita Ram Sharma, who was accused under Section 186 of the IPC for allegedly obstructing a police officer in the discharge of his duties.

The incident occurred when Sharma was stopped for not wearing a seatbelt and subsequently challenged under Sections 177 and 179 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

During the interaction, Sharma went live on Facebook and made certain remarks, which led to the obstruction charge.

The Prosecution argued that the petitioner’s actions, including going live on Facebook and making remarks, amounted to obstruction.

They claimed that such behaviour disrupted the police officer's duty and hence fell under the purview of Section 186 IPC.

However, Sharma's counsel contended that his client's actions were a form of passive conduct that did not interfere with the police officer’s ability to perform his duty.